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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.  
 
At issue in this appeal is whether all charges imposed 
by electronic discovery vendors to assist in the collection, 
processing, and production of electronically stored 
information (―ESI‖) are taxable against a losing party as 
―[f]ees for exemplification [or] the costs of making copies of 
any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for 
use in the case.‖  28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).  We have not 
previously addressed this issue, and the courts that have 
considered this question have reached conflicting results.  
Compare, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-
1732-LDD, 2011 WL 4793239, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011) 
(―We . . . award costs for the creation of a litigation database, 
storage of data, imaging hard drives, keyword searches, 
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deduplication, data extraction and processing.‖), with Rawal 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 07 C 5561, 2012 WL 581146, at 
*2-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2012) (refusing to award electronic 
processing costs as taxable).   
 
The District Court in this case concluded that more 
than $365,000 in charges imposed by the electronic discovery 
vendors, covering such activities as hard drive imaging, data 
processing, keyword searching, and file format conversion, 
are taxable, without differentiating between those charges that 
constitute ―[f]ees for exemplification,‖ and the charges that 
constitute ―costs of making copies.‖  § 1920(4).  In view of 
the significant role that electronic discovery plays in litigation 
today, involving the collection, processing, and production of 
huge volumes of data generated as a result of the information 
technology and communication revolutions, we believe it 
imperative to provide definitive guidance to the district courts 
in our Circuit on the question of the extent to which electronic 
discovery expenses are taxable.
1
  We conclude that none of 
                                              
1
 In 2004, it was estimated that approximately 95% of 
all documents were created by electronic means.  See, e.g., 
James M. Evangelista, Polishing the “Gold Standard” on the 
e-Discovery Cost-Shifting Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg, LLC, 9 J. Tech. L & Pol‘y 1, 2 (2004).  More 
importantly, the ease with which ESI is created, distributed, 
duplicated, and stored has resulted in exponentially greater 
volumes of data that must be assembled, analyzed, and 
produced in litigation.  See The Sedona Conference, The 
Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of 
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 
Sedona Conf. J. 189, 193 (2007) (―The shift of information 
storage to a digital realm has . . . caused an explosion in the 
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amount of information that resides in any enterprise[,] 
profoundly affecting litigation.‖).  It is estimated that in 2011, 
1.8 zettabytes of data were created, the equivalent of 57.5 
billion iPads, each with thirty-two gigabytes of storage.  See 
Press Release, EMC Corp., World‘s Data More than 
Doubling Every Two Years—Driving Big Data Opportunity, 
New IT Roles (June 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.emc.com/about/news/press/2011/20110628-
01.htm (citing John Gantz & David Reinsel, IDC, 2011 
Digital Universe Study: Extracting Value from Chaos 
(2011)). The burden and expense thus far associated with 
discovery of ESI has resulted in changes to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and to the adoption of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502, the rules governing discovery in a number of 
states, the adoption of proposed uniform rules by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and 
the promulgation of standards by the American Bar 
Association.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory 
committee‘s note (2006 amendments) (explaining changes to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the impact of the 
exponential growth in recoverable information); Fed. R. Evid. 
502 advisory committee‘s note (explaining the adoption of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 to respond, in part, to the 
proliferation of electronic information); Dan H. Willoughby 
et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 
60 Duke L.J. 789, 791 n.3 (2010) (discussing discovery rule 
changes in several states due to ESI); Nat‘l Conference of 
Comm‘rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Rules Relating to the 
Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (2007), 
available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/b11/archives/ulc/udoera/2007 
final.pdf; American Bar Association Civil Discovery 
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the electronic discovery vendors‘ activities in this case can be 
regarded as ―exemplification‖ of materials.  We further 
conclude that only scanning and file format conversion can be 
considered to be ―making copies,‖ an activity that amounts to 
approximately $30,000 of the more than $365,000 in 
electronic discovery charges taxed in this case.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter 
to the District Court to reduce the cost award accordingly. 
 
I. 
 
 In September of 2007, Appellant Race Tires America, 
Inc. (―RTA‖), a tire supplier, sued Appellees Hoosier Racing 
Tire Corp. (―Hoosier‖), a competitor, and Dirt Motor Sports, 
Inc. d/b/a World Racing Group (―DMS‖), a motorsports 
sanctioning body.  RTA asserted violations of Sections 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, arising out of the 
adoption of a ―single tire rule‖ for certain motorsports and the 
related exclusive supply contracts for race tires between 
Hoosier and a number of sanctioning bodies, including DMS.  
RTA estimated that damages, before trebling, exceeded $30 
million. 
 
                                                                                                     
Standard § 29 cmt. (2004) (discussing the 2004 amendments 
to the American Bar Association Civil Discovery Standards 
to facilitate electronic discovery).  
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 As would be expected in a case of this nature and 
magnitude, the parties engaged in extensive discovery of ESI.  
The Case Management Order (―CMO‖), issued by the District 
Court in January of 2008, directed the parties to attempt to 
agree upon a list of keyword search terms, with a party‘s use 
of such terms carrying a presumption that it had fulfilled its 
―obligation to conduct a reasonable search.‖  (A. 79.)  The 
CMO further provided that, unless native file format was 
―reasonably necessary to enable the other parties to review 
those files,‖ (A. 80), ESI was to ―be produced in ‗Tagged 
Image File Format,‘‖ accompanied by ―[a] cross reference or 
unitization file, in standard format (e.g. Opticon, Summation 
DII, or the like) showing the Bates number of each page and 
the appropriate unitization of the documents.‖2  (A. 79.)  The 
CMO further identified specific metadata fields that had to be 
produced if reasonably available.
3
  (A. 79-80.)  Finally, the 
                                              
2
 The native file format is the ―file structure defined by 
the original creating application,‖ such as a document created 
and opened in a word processing application.  The Sedona 
Conference, The Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery 
& Digital Information Management 35 (Sherry B. Harris et 
al. eds., 3
rd
 ed. 2010).  Tagged Image File Format (―TIFF‖) is 
―[a] widely used and supported graphic file format[] for 
storing bit-mapped images, with many different compression 
formats and resolutions.‖  Id. at 50.  TIFF ―[i]mages are 
stored in tagged fields, and programs use the tags to accept or 
ignore fields, depending on the application.‖  Id.  Unitization 
is ―[t]he assembly of individually scanned pages into 
documents.‖  Id. at 52.   
3
 Metadata is ―[d]ata typically stored electronically that 
describes characteristics of ESI, found in different places in 
different forms.‖  The Sedona Conference, supra note 2, at 
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CMO directed the parties to produce ―[a]n extracted text file 
or searchable version . . . for each electronic document in a 
document level text file (except for any file produced in 
native format).‖4  (A. 80.)  
 
 Hoosier and DMS each retained separate vendors to 
assist with the production of ESI.
5
  Specifically, DMS 
                                                                                                     
34.  While ―[s]ome metadata, such as file dates and sizes, can 
easily be seen by users[,] other metadata can be hidden or 
embedded and unavailable to computer users who are not 
technically adept.‖  Id.  For example, in this case, the District 
Court ordered the parties to produce ―metadata fields 
associated with each electronic document . . . where 
reasonably available,‖ including, in part, the fields of 
―BegDoc,‖ ―EndDoc,‖ ―BegAttach,‖ ―EndAttach,‖ ―Author,‖ 
―BCC,‖ ―CC,‖ ―Company,‖ ―Custodian Name,‖ ―Date 
Created,‖ ―Date Last Modified,‖ and ―Edit Time.‖  (A. 78-
79.)  Allowing discovery of these metadata fields permitted 
the parties to seek information that may not have been 
available in the documents‘ text. 
4
 An extracted text file is a file containing text taken 
from an original electronic document.  See The Sedona 
Conference, supra note 2, at 12 (defining ―[d]ata 
[e]xtraction‖).   
5
 Electronic discovery has spawned much more than 
―[a] cottage industry.‖  Hopson v. City of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 
228, 239 n.32 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting T. Delaney, E-Mail 
Discovery: The Duties, Danger and Expense, 46 Fed. Lawyer 
42, 44 (Jan. 1999)).  For the year 2009, electronic discovery 
vendors had revenues equaling approximately $2.8 billion.  
See Arin Greenwood, Law Practice: A New View, Part 2: E-
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retained Capital City Consulting (―CCC‖), a North Carolina 
firm, and Hoosier retained Preferred Imaging and Xact Data 
Discovery.  Based upon the vendors‘ invoices, RTA 
categorized the activities conducted by the vendors as 
follows:  (1) preservation and collection of ESI; (2) 
processing the collected ESI; (3) keyword searching; (4) 
culling privileged material; (5) scanning and TIFF 
conversion; (6) optical character recognition (―OCR‖) 
conversion; and (7) conversion of racing videos from VHS 
format to DVD format.
6
 
 
 In total, Hoosier produced 430,733 pages of ESI, and 
DMS produced 178,413 documents in electronic format.  In 
addition, ten DVDs of racing videos were produced.  Hoosier 
paid its electronic discovery vendors, Preferred Imaging and 
Xact Data Discovery, more than $125,000.  DMS claims to 
have incurred more than $240,000 in charges from CCC. 
 
 Discovery concluded on January 30, 2009.  DMS and 
Hoosier each then moved for summary judgment.  On 
                                                                                                     
Discovery Changes Have Some Seeing a Career in Document 
Review, 97 A.B.A. J. 27, 27 (2011) (citing George Socha & 
Tom Gelbmann, 2010 Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery 
Survey (2010)). 
6
 OCR is ―[a] technology process that translates and 
converts printed matter on an image into a format that a 
computer can manipulate . . . and, therefore, renders that 
matter text searchable.‖  The Sedona Conference, supra note 
2, at 37. 
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September 15, 2009, the District Court granted the defense 
summary judgment motions.  We affirmed the District 
Court‘s decision on July 23, 2010.  See Race Tires Am., Inc. 
v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
 Following completion of the appeals process, the Clerk 
for the District Court proceeded to consider the Bills of Costs 
that had been presented by DMS and Hoosier pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).  On the line of the Bill 
of Costs form for ―[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of 
making copies of any materials where the copies are 
necessarily obtained for use in the case,‖ DMS claimed 
$329,051.41 (A. 143), and Hoosier claimed $143,007.05.  (A. 
82.)  In response to RTA‘s objection to the DMS Bill of 
Costs, DMS acknowledged that the invoices of its vendor, 
CCC, ―were exceedingly confusing and inconsistent.‖  (A. 
268.)  As a result, DMS ―mistakenly included duplicate 
invoices,‖ and asserted that ―its actual e-discovery costs 
[were] $241,139.37,‖ an amount that was almost $88,000 less 
than its original claim.  (A. 268.) 
 
 The Clerk of the District Court, in his Taxation of 
Costs, stated that ―[t]his is the first case in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania that a party has requested [that 
electronic discovery] costs be taxed.‖  (A. 29.)  Noting that 
there was no precedent on this issue from this Court, and that 
the district courts across the country are divided on the issue, 
and further observing that the CMO set forth procedures for 
complying with electronic discovery requests, the Clerk 
concluded that electronic discovery costs would be 
―consider[ed] . . . taxable, as opposed to just . . . the costs of 
litigating.‖  (A. 30.)  In support of this conclusion, the Clerk 
distinguished the Western District of Pennsylvania‘s general 
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rule disallowing copying charges as ―office expenses and part 
of the costs of litigation,‖ (A. 21) (citing Krouse v. American 
Sterilizer Co., 928 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Pa. 1996)), stating that 
―the requirements and expertise necessary to retrieve and 
prepare these e-discovery documents [were] an indispensable 
part of the process.‖  (A. 30.)   
 
 Of the $143,007.05 sought by Hoosier, the Clerk taxed 
the amount of $125,580.55.  It reduced the claim for ―copy 
charges‖ appearing in a general ledger with no supporting 
detail, as well as charges for services performed by Hoosier‘s 
law firm‘s Litigation Support Department, including OCR 
conversion, TIFF conversion, and electronic data discovery 
processing because, the Clerk explained, ―these items were 
not done by a third party, and therefore are part of the costs of 
litigating.‖7  (A. 31.)  As to DMS, the Clerk awarded its full 
request of ―e-discovery fees . . . in the amount of 
$241,778.81.‖  (A. 32.)  
 
RTA responded to the Clerk‘s taxation of costs by 
filing with the District Court a Motion to Appoint Special 
Master Regarding E-Discovery Issues and a Motion to 
Review Taxation of Costs.  In a Memorandum Opinion issued 
on May 6, 2011, the District Court declined to appoint a 
Special Master and affirmed the Clerk‘s taxation of the 
electronic discovery vendor charges.  See Race Tires Am., 
Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 
WL 1748620, at *12 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011).  After 
commenting on the contentious nature of the discovery and 
the extensive amount of ESI produced during the litigation, 
                                              
7
 Hoosier did not contest the Clerk‘s reductions to its 
Bill of Costs. 
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and canvassing the extant case law, the District Court 
concluded that the entire amounts charged by the electronic 
discovery vendors were taxable.  Id.  In reaching this result, 
the District Court essentially found that ―the steps the third-
party vendor(s) performed appeared to be the electronic 
equivalent of exemplification and copying,‖ (id. at *8), 
reiterating the Clerk of Court‘s comment that ―the 
requirements and expertise necessary to retrieve and prepare . 
. . e-discovery documents for production were an 
indispensable part of the discovery process.‖  Id. at *9.  
Without assessing each of the discrete functions performed by 
the vendors, the District Court also concluded that the 
vendors‘ charges were ―necessarily incurred and reasonable.‖  
Id. at *10.  In support of this conclusion, the District Court 
noted that the amounts charged by the vendors in this case 
were ―within the parameters set forth in the case law.‖  Id.  
Finally, the District Court made clear that it regarded its 
taxation of electronic discovery vendor costs as not 
establishing a precedent as to ―how this Court or any other 
member of this Court will rule on future disputes regarding 
costs of e-discovery,‖ explaining that it regarded ―the facts 
and circumstances of this case [to be] unique.‖  Id. at *12.  
 
RTA timely appealed the District Court‘s taxation of 
the electronic discovery vendor charges.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
II. 
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) states that 
―[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or court order provides 
otherwise, costs—other than attorney‘s fees—should be 
allowed to the prevailing party.‖  Although Rule 54(d)(1) 
13 
 
stipulates that ―costs . . . should be allowed to the prevailing 
party,‖ (emphasis added), Congress, in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, 
specified the litigation expenses that qualify as taxable 
―costs.‖  See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 
U.S. 437, 441 (1987) (―[Section] 1920 defines the term 
‗costs‘ as used in Rule 54(d).‖).  Section 1920 provides:  
 
A judge or clerk of any court of 
the United States may tax as costs 
the following: 
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 
(2) Fees for printed or 
electronically recorded transcripts 
necessarily obtained for use in the 
case; 
(3) Fees and disbursements for 
printing and witnesses; 
(4) Fees for exemplification and 
the costs of making copies of any 
materials where the copies are 
necessarily obtained for use in the 
case; 
(5) Docket fees under section 
1923 of this title; 
(6) Compensation of court 
appointed experts, compensation 
of interpreters, and salaries, fees, 
expenses, and costs of special 
interpretation services under 
section 1828 of this title. 
 
At issue in this case is § 1920(4), ―[f]ees for 
exemplification and the costs of making copies of any 
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materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in 
the case.‖  Following the example of the late Judge Edward 
Becker in addressing other issues pertaining to the taxation of 
costs, we first examine ―a page of history‖ to assist us in our 
understanding of § 1920(4).  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB 
Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 456 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting N.Y. Trust 
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)) (―Upon this point a 
page of history is worth a volume of logic.‖).   
 
Section 1920 is the modern codification of the Fee Act 
of 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161-69 (1853).  See Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 255 (1975).  
Prior to the 1853 Act, the federal courts‘ taxation of costs 
against losing litigants conformed to the state rules governing 
such matters, resulting in ―great diversity in practice among 
the courts and . . . losing litigants . . . being unfairly saddled 
with exorbitant fees for the victor‘s attorney.‖  Id. at 251.  To 
avoid these problems, ―Congress undertook to standardize the 
costs allowable in federal litigation.‖  Id.  ―The result was a 
far-reaching Act specifying in detail the nature and amount of 
the taxable items of cost in the federal courts.‖  Id. at 251-52.   
 
The 1853 Act embodied the American ―depart[ure] 
from the English practice of attempting to provide the 
successful litigant with total reimbursement.‖  10 Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. 
Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2665 (3d ed. 
1998).  The ―American rule‖ against shifting the expense of 
litigation to the losing party is ―founded on the egalitarian 
concept of providing relatively easy access to the courts to all 
citizens and reducing the threat of liability for litigation 
expenses as an obstacle to the commencement of a lawsuit or 
the assertion of a defense that might have some merit.‖  Id. 
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The ―substance [of the 1853 Act], without any 
apparent intent to change the controlling rules, was . . . 
included in the Revised [Judicial] Code of 1948 as 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1920 and 1923(a).‖  Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. 
at 255.  In Crawford Fitting Co., the Court reiterated its 
understanding that ―[t]he comprehensive scope of the [1853] 
Act and the particularity with which it was drafted 
demonstrated . . . that Congress meant to impose rigid 
controls on cost-shifting in federal courts.‖  482 U.S. at 444.  
In holding that expert witness fees are not taxable under § 
1920(3) as ―[f]ees and disbursements for printing and 
witnesses,‖ the Crawford Fitting Co. Court essentially 
―rejected a line of authority recognizing other possible 
sources for an award of costs, including local rules, the 
custom of the district, and the court‘s general equitable 
powers.‖  6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 
Practice § 54.103(3)(a) (3
rd
 ed. 1999). 
 
Section 1920 thus ―define[s] the full extent of a federal 
court‘s power to shift litigation costs absent express statutory 
authority.‖  W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 
86 (1991).  ―[W]hether a particular expense falls within the 
purview of section 1920, and thus may be taxed in the first 
place, is an issue of statutory construction, subject to de novo 
review.‖  Synopsys, Inc. v. Ricoh Co. (In re Ricoh Co. Patent 
Litig.), 661 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Summit 
Tech., Inc. v. Nidek Co., 435 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). 
 
 The question presented here is whether § 1920(4) 
authorizes the taxation of an electronic discovery consultant‘s 
charges for data collection, preservation, searching, culling, 
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conversion, and production as either the ―exemplification [or] 
the . . . making [of] copies of any materials where the copies 
are necessarily obtained for use in the case.‖  § 1920(4).  This 
language first appeared in § 3 of the 1853 Act, which in part 
provided that the ―lawful fees for exemplifications and copies 
of papers necessarily obtained for use on trial . . . shall be 
taxed by a judge or clerk of the court.‖  10 Stat. 168.  Section 
3‘s language was carried over through to the 1948 revision of 
the Judicial Code with two substantive changes.  See 
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 955 
(1948).  The 1948 Act broadened the recoverable 
exemplification and copy fees from those ―obtained for use 
on trials‖ to those ―obtained for use in the case.‖  Id.  It also 
replaced the mandatory language of the prior statute, which 
read that costs ―shall be taxed,‖ to provide, consistent with 
the discretionary language of Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that the court ―may tax as costs‖ 
any of the enumerated categories of expenses.  Id. 
 
The subdivision providing for the award of fees for 
exemplification and copying costs has been amended only 
once since 1948.  In 2008, the statute‘s reference to ―copies of 
papers‖ was replaced with ―the costs of making copies of any 
materials.‖  Judicial Administration and Technical 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-406, § 6, 122 Stat. 
4291 (2008) (emphasis added).  This amendment to § 1920(4) 
originated with a recommendation of the Judicial Conference 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management.  
See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the 
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 9 
(Mar. 18, 2003).  The Committee ―was asked to consider 
whether the list of taxable costs should be amended to include 
expenses associated with new courtroom technologies.‖  Id. at 
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9-10.  The Committee, ―[c]oncluding that adding the full 
range of such costs might go well beyond the intended scope 
of the statute, . . . recommended that the [Judicial] 
Conference endorse two limited amendments to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1920.‖  Id. at 10.  One of the two proposed ―limited 
amendments‖ was ―to permit taxing the costs associated with 
copying materials[,] whether or not they are in paper form.‖  
Id.  
 
III. 
 
RTA argues that the electronic discovery costs taxed 
against it do not constitute fees for ―exemplification‖ or the 
―making of copies.‖  (Appellant‘s Br. 23, 29.)  Hoosier and 
DMS argue that their incurred electronic discovery costs fall 
within the statute‘s allowance for costs for ―exemplification‖ 
and ―making copies,‖ without drawing any real distinction 
between the two terms.  (DMS‘s Br. 6, Hoosier‘s Br. 11, 14) 
(internal citations omitted).  We, however, do not think that 
the terms are interchangeable or synonymous.  ―It is a well-
established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of 
different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that 
Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those 
words.‖  S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 
2003) (citations omitted).  As we remarked in Tavarez v. 
Klingensmith, ―[i]f possible, we must give effect to every 
clause and word of a statute, . . . and be reluctant to treat 
statutory terms as surplusage.‖  372 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration 
omitted). 
 
A. 
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Accordingly, we first determine whether the services 
for which the District Court taxed costs qualify as 
―exemplification‖ of materials.  The courts that have 
differentiated ―exemplification‖ from ―making copies‖ in the 
context of § 1920(4) have reached different conclusions as to 
the term‘s meaning.  In Kohus v. Cosco, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355, 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Federal Circuit, applying Sixth 
Circuit law, reversed an award of the costs for producing a 
video exhibit.  Observing that ―Congress did not use the 
broad phrase ‗demonstrative evidence‘ in section 1920,‖ and 
predicting that the Sixth Circuit would apply the narrow 
―legal definition‖ of exemplification as ―an official transcript 
of a public record, authenticated as a true copy for use as 
evidence,‖ id. at 1359 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 593 
(7th ed. 1999)), the court ruled that the district court lacked 
―statutory authority to award costs for the video.‖  Id.  
 
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted ―exemplification‖ 
expansively, as ―the act of illustration by example,‖ a 
definition ―broad enough to include a wide variety of exhibits 
and demonstrative aids.‖  Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 
F.3d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary 406 (10th ed. 1993)).  Thus, in the 
Seventh Circuit, exemplification fees may be awarded ―[s]o 
long as the means of presentation furthers the illustrative 
purpose of an exhibit.‖  Id. at 428.  
 
There is no need to decide whether Congress used the 
term ―exemplification‖ in its narrow ―legal sense,‖ or in the 
broader sense adopted by the Seventh Circuit.  The electronic 
discovery vendors‘ work in this case did not produce 
illustrative evidence or the authentication of public records.  
19 
 
Their charges accordingly would not qualify as fees for 
―exemplification‖ under either construction of the term. 
 
B. 
 
We next consider § 1920‘s allowance for the ―costs of 
making copies.‖  The noun ―copy‖ is defined as ―an imitation, 
transcript, or reproduction of an original work.‖  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 504 (3
rd
 ed. 1993).  The 
dictionary definition is consistent with its common use to 
denote something that is made to duplicate something else, 
usually an ―original.‖  For example, a 2,000-year-old copy of 
the Ten Commandments recently went on display in New 
York.  The term ―copy‖ helps to convey that we are not 
referring to the original stone tablets on which the 
commandments were inscribed; what is on display is a 
parchment copy of the original stone tablets.  The word 
―copy‖ is frequently utilized to refer to ―photocopies‖ or 
―xerox copies‖ – reproductions of documents made using 
―copy‖ machines.  Indeed, since the advent of photocopying 
technology, the allowance for fees for ―copies‖ under 
§ 1920(4) has been relied upon by prevailing parties to 
recover photocopying costs.  See, e.g., Northbrook Excess & 
Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 643 
(7th Cir. 1991); Tokyo Electron Ariz., Inc. v. Discreet Indus. 
Corp., 215 F.R.D. 60, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Gen. Cas. Co. of 
Am. v. Stanchfield, 23 F.R.D. 58, 60 (D. Mont. 1959).  The 
most recent amendment to the statute, however, permitting an 
award to the prevailing party of the cost of making copies of 
―materials,‖ plainly signifies that § 1920(4)‘s allowance for 
copying costs is not limited to paper copying.  We must 
accordingly decide whether any of the electronic discovery 
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vendor charges in this case qualify as the ―costs of making 
copies of any materials.‖ 
 
The invoices that Hoosier and DMS submitted in 
support of their Bills of Costs are notable for their lack of 
specificity and clarity as to the services actually performed.  
For instance, Preferred Imaging invoices appended to the Bill 
of Costs have thousands of dollars in charges for ―EDD 
Processing,‖ without explaining what that activity 
encompasses.  (A. 133.)  And while Preferred Image‘s use of 
the phrase ―Performing Searching/Filtering/Exporting‖ may 
be less obtuse, the invoices provide no indication of the 
rationale for these activities, nor their results in terms of the 
actual production of discovery material.  (A. 133.)  These 
activities also amount to thousands of dollars in charges.  The 
CCC invoices are similarly replete with technical jargon that 
makes it difficult to decipher what exactly was done.  RTA‘s 
brief was helpful in categorizing the invoices‘ numerous 
entries, and with its guidance, we identify the following 
general categories of services comprising the vendors‘ 
electronic discovery services: collecting and preserving ESI; 
processing and indexing ESI; keyword searching of ESI for 
responsive and privileged documents; converting native files 
to TIFF; and scanning paper documents to create electronic 
images. 
 
Of the activities undertaken by the vendors, only the 
conversion of native files to TIFF (the agreed-upon default 
format for production of ESI), and the scanning of documents 
to create digital duplicates are generally recognized as the 
taxable ―making copies of material.‖  See, e.g., Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009) (costs of 
―converting computer data into a readable format in response 
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to plaintiffs‘ discovery requests . . . are recoverable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1920.‖); BDT Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 405 F.3d 
415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005) (―[E]lectronic scanning and imaging 
could be interpreted as ‗exemplification and copies of 
papers.‘‖); Brown v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 526 F. Supp. 2d 950, 
959 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (―[T]he electronic scanning of 
documents is the modern-day equivalent of ‗. . . copies of 
paper,‘ and, therefore, can be taxed pursuant to § 1920(4).‖).  
We agree that scanning and conversion of native files to the 
agreed-upon format for production of ESI constitute ―making 
copies of materials.‖   
 
In this case, the charges for scanning and TIFF 
conversion comprise only approximately $20,000 of the more 
than $365,000 in electronic discovery charges awarded in this 
case.  RTA agrees that the format conversion charges are 
authorized under § 1920(4), but asserts that there has been no 
showing that the resulting digital copies were necessarily 
obtained for use in the case.  Once statutory authority to tax 
costs has been established, however, the amount awarded is 
reviewed only for abuse of discretion.  See In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d at 458 (―Given the district court‘s 
discretionary equitable power to award costs under Rule 
54(d)(1), taxation of costs is reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion.‖) (citations omitted).  In light of the volume of ESI 
produced in this case, we cannot find that the inclusion of all 
scanning and TIFF conversion costs was an abuse of the 
District Court‘s discretion.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
taxation of $20,083.51, representing the scanning and TIFF 
conversion undertaken on behalf of Hoosier.
8
 
                                              
8
 The CCC invoices do not disclose any charge for 
scanning or TIFF conversion. 
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Although perhaps not falling within the technical 
expertise of electronic discovery vendors, the cost of 
transferring VHS recordings to DVD format similarly 
qualifies as ―making copies.‖  RTA, while acknowledging 
that this activity is taxable, disputes the amount taxed, 
observing that only 10 of 31 converted videos were produced 
to it.  Once again, however, the question of the amount of 
costs to be taxed for copies necessarily obtained for use in the 
case falls within the District Court‘s ample discretion, and we 
cannot find an abuse of discretion in the District Court‘s 
decision to tax the cost for transferring all of the videos, 
totaling $10,286.91. 
 
The District Court, while acknowledging the lack of 
controlling precedent and the division of opinion among the 
federal courts outside of this Circuit, held that Hoosier and 
DMS were entitled to an award of all electronic discovery 
charges imposed by their electronic discovery vendors.  In 
reaching this decision, the District Court placed special 
reliance on CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 
F. Supp. 2d 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353, 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
9
  In that case, the District Court 
rejected the plaintiff‘s objections to the defendant‘s claim for 
$243,453.02 in fees charged by the defendant‘s electronic 
discovery vendor ―to collect, search, identify and help 
produce electronic documents from [the defendant‘s] network 
                                              
9
 After the District Court‘s ruling in the matter before 
us, the Federal Circuit vacated the trial court‘s cost rulings 
because it had reversed the trial court‘s finding of patent 
invalidity.  See CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 
654 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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files and hard drives in response to [the plaintiff‘s] discovery 
requests.‖  Id. at 1380.  In overruling the plaintiff‘s objection, 
the District Court reasoned that the vendor‘s ―highly 
technical‖ services were not ―the type of services that 
attorneys or paralegals are trained for or are capable of 
providing.‖  Id. at 1381.  The District Court, acknowledging 
the statutory requirement, then remarked that ―[the services] 
are the 21st Century equivalent of making copies.‖  Id.  The 
District Court did not explain how all the various services 
performed by the vendor to achieve the production of 
electronic documents amounted to ―making copies,‖ 
seemingly concluding that, because all the various services 
were necessary to the ultimate production of electronic 
―copies,‖ the services were equivalent to one entire act of 
―making copies.‖   
 
The District Court cited the CBT Flint Partners, LLC 
Court‘s reasoning in affirming the Clerk of Court‘s taxation 
of Hoosier‘s and DMS‘s electronic discovery costs, writing: 
―[a] careful review of the vendor‘s invoices reveals that the 
services provided were not the type of services that attorneys 
or paralegals are trained for or are capable of providing.  The 
services were highly technical.‖  Race Tires Am., Inc., 2011 
WL 1748620, at *9.  The District Court also found it 
significant that the services performed by Hoosier‘s and 
DMS‘s electronic discovery vendors ―to retrieve and prepare 
these e-discovery documents for production[,] were an 
indispensable part of the discovery process.‖  Id. 
 
Indeed, in the view of courts that have upheld the 
taxation of electronic discovery costs pursuant to § 1920(4), 
the ―indispensability‖ of the services to the ultimate act of 
production of intelligible electronic documents has been a 
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significant factor.  Those courts, like the CBT Flint Partners, 
LLC Court, explain that because the electronic discovery 
services are highly technical and beyond the expertise of the 
prevailing party‘s own attorneys, the fees that are incurred in 
retaining experts to perform the services are unavoidable.  
See, e.g., Tibble v. Edison Int’l, No. CV 07-5359, 2011 WL 
3759927, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (more than 
$500,000 in electronic discovery costs ―necessarily incurred‖ 
to respond to plaintiff‘s discovery requests were taxable); 
Parrish v. Manatt, Phelps, & Phillips, LLP, No. C 10-03200 
WHA, 2011 WL 1362112, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) 
(―The tasks of collecting client documents, reviewing those 
documents, and determining which documents are relevant 
are essential—and often costly—parts of investigation and 
discovery.‖).  Other courts have pointed to the efficiencies 
and cost savings resulting from the efforts of electronic 
discovery consultants as justification to tax their charges to 
the losing side.  See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 
2011 WL 4793239, at *3 (―The court is persuaded that in 
cases of this complexity, e-discovery saves costs overall by 
allowing discovery to be conducted in an efficient and cost-
effective manner.‖).   
 
The decisions that allow taxation of all, or essentially 
all, electronic discovery consultant charges, such as the 
District Court‘s ruling in this case, are untethered from the 
statutory mooring.  Section 1920(4) does not state that all 
steps that lead up to the production of copies of materials are 
taxable.  It does not authorize taxation merely because 
today‘s technology requires technical expertise not ordinarily 
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possessed by the typical legal professional.
10
  It does not say 
that activities that encourage cost savings may be taxed.  
Section 1920(4) authorizes awarding only the cost of making 
copies.   
 
It may be that extensive ―processing‖ of ESI is 
essential to make a comprehensive and intelligible 
production.  Hard drives may need to be imaged, the imaged 
drives may need to be searched to identify relevant files, 
relevant files may need to be screened for privileged or 
otherwise protected information, file formats may need to be 
converted, and ultimately files may need to be transferred to 
different media for production.  But that does not mean that 
the services leading up to the actual production constitute 
―making copies.‖ 
 
The process employed in the pre-digital era to produce 
documents in complex litigation similarly involved a number 
of steps essential to the ultimate act of production.  First, the 
paper files had to be located.  The files then had to be 
collected, or a document reviewer had to travel to where the 
files were located.  The documents, or duplicates of the 
documents, were then reviewed to determine those that may 
have been relevant.  The files designated as potentially 
relevant had to be screened for privileged or otherwise 
protected material.  Ultimately, a large volume of documents 
would have been processed to produce a smaller set of 
                                              
10
 Significantly, the District Court in this case 
disallowed taxation of OCR and TIFF conversion performed 
by the ―Litigation Support Department‖ of the law firm 
representing Hoosier, while taxing charges imposed by 
vendors for the same activities.  (A. 31.) 
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relevant documents.  None of the steps that preceded the 
actual act of making copies in the pre-digital era would have 
been considered taxable.  And that is because Congress did 
not authorize taxation of charges necessarily incurred to 
discharge discovery obligations.  It allowed only for the 
taxation of the costs of making copies. 
 
The result does not depend upon whether the activities 
leading up to the making of copies are performed by third 
party consultants with ―technical expertise.‖  As expressed by 
one court, ―[s]ection 1920(4) speaks narrowly of ‗[f]ees for 
exemplification and copies of papers,‘ suggesting that fees are 
permitted only for the physical preparation and duplication of 
documents, not the intellectual effort involved in their 
production.‖  Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 
1428 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363 
(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).  Neither the degree of expertise 
necessary to perform the work nor the identity of the party 
performing the work of ―making copies‖ is a factor that can 
be gleaned from §1920(4). 
 
Those courts that have refused to award the costs of 
electronic discovery vendors beyond file format conversion 
have recognized that gathering, preserving, processing, 
searching, culling, and extracting ESI simply do not amount 
to ―making copies.‖  For instance, in Mann v. Heckler & 
Koch Defense, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-611, 2011 WL 1599580, at * 
9 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011), the court observed that ―such 
tasks as ‗Searching and Deduping,‘ and ‗Creation of Native 
File Database with Full Text and Metadata Extraction,‘‖ do 
not qualify as ―copying.‖  Acknowledging the 2008 
amendment to § 1920(4) that substituted ―materials‖ for 
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―papers,‖ the court aptly stated that the statute ―still requires 
copying.‖  Id. (emphasis omitted).  In In re Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 1:01-cv-1950-RWS, 2011 WL 
2671296, at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2011), the court analogized 
keyword searching to a room full of reviewers physically 
reviewing paper documents.  Just as the cost of reviewers 
examining documents is not taxable, so too the task of 
keyword searching is not taxable.  Id.  In In re Fast Memory 
Erase v. Spansion, Inc., the court awarded nearly $200,000 
―for creating TIFF/OCR images of documents responsive to 
plaintiff‘s discovery requests,‖ but disallowed more than 
$860,000 ―for collecting and processing more than 2,100 
gigabytes of . . . ESI.‖  No. 3-10-CV-0481-M-BD, 2010 WL 
5093945, *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2010).  The court found that 
data collection and extraction of relevant discoverable ESI 
was more like non-taxable attorney and paralegal review than 
copying.  Id. at *6 (citing Kellogg Brown & Root Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altanmia Commercial Mktg. Co., W.W.L., No. H-07-2684, 
2009 WL 1457632 at *6 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2009)).   
 
These decisions recognize that ―the types of costs 
recoverable under Rule 54(d)(1) are circumscribed.‖  In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d at 457.  They are also 
consistent with the Supreme Court‘s ―precept that district 
courts . . . cannot award costs not enumerated under § 1920.‖  
Fells v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 605 F. Supp. 2d 740, 743-44 
(E.D. Va. 2009) (refusing to tax costs of processing records, 
extracting data, and converting files).  Nor may the courts 
invoke equitable concerns, as appears to have been an 
animating factor in this case, to justify an award of costs for 
services that Congress has not made taxable.  See Romero, 
883 F.2d at 1428. 
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Hoosier argues that the services leading to the ultimate 
act of production cannot be parsed into taxable and non-
taxable activities, asserting that ―this approach ignores the 
reality that many technical processes are necessary for the 
production of intelligible electronic copies.‖  (Hoosier‘s Br. 
21.)  A review of the invoices in this matter belies Hoosier‘s 
assertion.  As demonstrated by the courts that have taxed the 
cost of scanning and file format conversion while not taxing 
other activities, it is possible to tax only the costs incurred for 
the physical preparation of ESI produced in litigation.  See, 
e.g., In re Fast Memory Erase, 2010 WL 5093945, at *4 
(awarding nearly $200,000 for TIFF/OCR conversion but 
disallowing more than $860,000 for collecting and processing 
in excess of 2,100 gigabytes of ESI).  The highly technical 
nature of the services simply does not exempt parties who 
seek to recover their electronic discovery costs under 
§ 1920(4) from showing that the costs fall within the 
subsection‘s limited allowance for ―the costs of making 
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily 
obtained for use in the case.‖ 
 
Furthermore, we do not think it is significant that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the discovery of 
ESI or that the parties agreed to ―exchange responsive and 
discoverable ESI.‖  (A. 79.)  Indeed, there is a ―presumption . 
. . that the responding party must bear the expense of 
complying with discovery requests.‖  Oppenheimer Fund, 
Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).  A responding 
party, however, ―may invoke the district court‘s discretion 
under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‗undue 
burden or expense‘ in [complying with discovery requests], 
including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting 
party‘s payment of the costs of discovery.‖  Id.  Here, neither 
29 
 
Hoosier nor DMS obtained a cost-shifting protective order.  
We are consequently limited to shifting only those costs 
explicitly enumerated in § 1920.
11
  Crawford Fitting Co., 482 
U.S. at 441.   
                                              
11
 In addition to CBT Flint Partners, LLC, Hoosier 
relies on a recent decision from the Federal Circuit, Synopsys, 
Inc. v. Ricoh Co. (In re Ricoh Co. Patent Litigation), 661 F.3d 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011), in support of its position that electronic 
discovery costs are taxable under § 1920(4).  In that case, the 
parties had agreed to have a third party vendor load and host 
e-mails in native format in a secure document review 
database.  Id. at 1364-65.  Furthermore, the parties agreed to 
share the cost of creating and maintaining the document 
review database.  Id. at 1365.  The Federal Circuit, although 
finding that the cost of an agreed-upon database that served as 
the platform for the parties to obtain documents was taxable, 
reversed the District Court‘s award of those costs because the 
parties had agreed to share that expense.  Id. at 1367.  In re 
Ricoh Patent Litigation is plainly distinguishable because the 
parties had agreed to the creation of a specific document 
review database by a specific vendor for document 
production purposes, unlike this case, where Hoosier and 
DMS retained their own electronic discovery consultants.  
Furthermore, we have acknowledged that the costs of 
conversion to an agreed-upon production format are taxable 
as the functional equivalent of ―making copies.‖  It is all the 
other activity, such as searching, culling, and deduplication, 
that are not taxable.  In re Ricoh Patent Litigation affords no 
assistance to Hoosier and DMS in this regard, as it did not 
address the question of whether the activities undertaken by 
the electronic discovery vendors in this case are the 
equivalent of ―making copies.‖ 
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III. 
 
Neither the language of § 1920(4), nor its history, 
suggests that Congress intended to shift all the expenses of a 
particular form of discovery—production of ESI—to the 
losing party.  Nor can such a result find support in Supreme 
Court precedent, which has accorded a narrow reading of the 
cost statute in other contexts.  See, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co., 
482 U.S. at 442.  Although there may be strong policy 
reasons in general, or compelling equitable circumstances in a 
particular case, to award the full cost of electronic discovery 
to the prevailing party, the federal courts lack the authority to 
do so, either generally or in particular cases, under the cost 
statute.
12
 
 
In sum, we conclude that of the numerous services the 
vendors performed, only the scanning of hard copy 
documents, the conversion of native files to TIFF, and the 
transfer of VHS tapes to DVD involved ―copying,‖ and that 
the costs attributable to only those activities are recoverable 
under § 1920(4)‘s allowance for the ―costs of making copies 
of any materials.‖  Those costs total $30,370.42.  We find that 
none of the charges imposed by DMS‘s vendor are taxable, 
                                              
12
 Cost-shifting may be effected during the course of 
litigation, either by agreement or pursuant to court order 
issued under the authority of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.  After 
litigation, cost-shifting may be ordered as a sanction for 
vexatious conduct that reflects bad faith, as opposed to 
―misunderstanding, bad judgment, or well-intentioned zeal.‖  
LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. First Conn. Holding Grp., LLC, 287 
F.3d 279, 289 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).   
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and that the award in favor of Hoosier should be reduced by 
$95,210.13, the difference between the electronic discovery 
vendors‘ charges awarded by the District Court ($125,580.55) 
and the charges of Hoosier‘s electronic discovery vendors we 
find taxable ($30,370.42).  We will accordingly vacate the 
District Court‘s award of costs and remand to the District 
Court to re-tax costs in accordance with this opinion. 
